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Abstract
In this paper, we extend defeasible logic (a
computationally-oriented non-monotonic logic) in
order to deal with temporalised rules. In particu-
lar, we extend the logic to cope with durative facts,
as well as with delays between the antecedent and
the consequent of rules. We showed that the ex-
tended temporalised framework is suitable to model
different types of causal relations which have been
identified by the specialised literature. Finally, we
also demonstrate that the computational properties
of the original logic are still retained by the ex-
tended approach.
1 Introduction
Non-monotonic logic has been proposed as an appropriate
representation of common-sense reasoning. As a matter of
fact, the notion of defeasible conclusion, i.e., a conclusion
that can be revised if more evidence is provided, is at hart
of commonsense reasoning and therefore of non-monotonic
logic. Over the year a plethora of non-monotonic formalisms
have been investigated. However, a common issue of most
non-monotonic logics is their high computational complex-
ity. To obviate this problem Nute [20] proposed Defeasible
logic . Defeasible logic is a rule based non-monotonic for-
malism that has been designed from beginning to be compu-
tationally feasible and easily implementable. Off course there
is a trade-off between the expressive power of a logic and
its computational complexity. Recently, a number of stud-
ies has shown that Defeasible Logic seems to be appropri-
ate to reason in several application areas, ranging from mod-
elling of contracts [12; 6], legal reasoning [21; 11], agent ne-
gotiations [7], modelling of agents and agent societies [10;
9], and applications to the Semantic Web [2]. An impor-
tant finding of these investigations is that time is essen-
tial for an accurate representation of real world scenarios.
While Defeasible logic proved to be suitable to cope with
most of the phenomena specific to the application domains,
the treatment of the temporal issues have been by large ig-
nored, and still is an open problem. Recently a few exten-
sions of Defeasible logic with time have been proposed [11;
8].
[11] proposes an extension where each proposition is
paired with a timestamp representing the time when the
proposition holds. The aim of this work [11] is to study the
notion of persistence. On the other hand [8] extends defeasi-
ble logic by attaching two temporal dimensions to each rules:
the first to tell when a rule is deliberated (i.e., when a rule is
created), and the second for the time of validity of a rule (i.e.
when a rule can be used). In both cases only instantaneous
events are considered and there are no explicit temporal re-
lationships between the antecedent and the conclusion of a
rule. On the other hand such issues are important not only to
model many application domains but also to represent theo-
retical notions such as, for instance, causal relationships.
In this paper we overcome such limitations by proposing
an extension of defeasible Logic to cope with durative events
and with delays between antecedents (causes) and conclu-
sions (effects) of rules in the logic.
In this paper we will first recall the basics of defeasible
logic (Section 2), then we introduce and motivate the ex-
tended temporal formalism (Section 3) 4 illustrates the ap-
plication of the formalism to model some types of causal re-
lations. In Section 5 we formally describe the logic and its
inference mechanism. We also show that the proposed ex-
tension preserves the computational behaviour of defeasible
logic. Finally we sketch conclusions and possible extensions.
2 Defeasible Logic
Over the years Defeasible Logic [20; 3] proved to be a flex-
ible non-monotonic formalism able to capture different and
sometimes incompatible facets of non-monotonic reasoning
[4], and efficient and powerful implementations have been
proposed [17; 12].
Knowledge in Defeasible Logic can be represented in two
ways: facts and rules.
Facts are indisputable statements, represented either in
form of states of affairs (literal and modal literal) and actions
that have been performed. Facts are represented by predi-
cates. For example, “Tweety is a penguin” is represented by
Penguin(Tweety).
A rule, on the other hand, describes the relationship be-
tween a set of literals (premises) and a literal (conclusion),
and we can specify how strong the relationship is. As usual
rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set of
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premises. As far as the strength of rules is concerned we dis-
tinguish between strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters.
Strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters are represented,
respectively, by expressions of the form A1, . . . ,An → B,
A1, . . . ,An⇒B and A1, . . . ,An;B, where A1, . . . ,An is a pos-
sibly empty set of prerequisites (causes) and B is the conclu-
sion (effect) of the rule. We only consider rules that are es-
sentially propositional. Rules containing free variables are
interpreted as the set of their ground instances.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the
premises are indisputable then so is the conclusion. Thus
they can be used for definitional clauses. An example of a
strict rule is “Penguins are birds”, formally: Penguin(X)→
Bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary
evidence. An example of such a rule is “Birds usually fly”:
Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X). The idea is that if we know that X is a
bird, then we may conclude that X is entitled to a discount
unless there is other evidence suggesting that she may not fly.
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used
to prevent conclusions not to support them. For example:
Heavy(X); ¬Fly(X). This rule states that if something is
heavy thenit might not fly. This rule can prevent the deriva-
tion of a “fly” conclusion. On the other hand it cannot be used
to support a “not fly” conclusion.
DL is a “skeptical” non-monotonic logic, meaning that it
does not support contradictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks
to resolve conflicts. In cases where there is some support for
concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, DL does
not conclude either of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If
the support for A has priority over the support for ¬A then A
is concluded. No conclusion can be drawn from conflicting
rules in DL unless these rules are prioritised. The superiority
relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules,
that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another
rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : Bird(X)⇒ Fly(X)
r′ : Penguin(X)⇒¬Fly(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be
made about whether a Tweety can fly or not. But if we intro-
duce a superiority relation  with r′  r, then we can indeed
conclude that Tweety cannot fly since it is a penguin.
We now give a short informal presentation of how conclu-
sions are drawn in DL. A D be a theory in DL (i.e., a collec-
tion of facts, rules and a superiority relation). A conclusion
of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four
forms:
+∆Xq meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using
only facts and strict rules).
−∆Xq meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely
provable in D.
+∂Xq meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂Xq meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly
provable in D.
Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict
rules, while a defeasible conclusion p can be derived if there
is a rule whose conclusion is p, whose prerequisites (an-
tecedent) have either already been proved or given in the case
at hand (i.e., facts), and any stronger rule whose conclusion
is ¬p has prerequisites that fail to be derived. In other words,
a conclusion p is derivable when:
• p is a fact; or
• there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for p, and
either
– all the rules for ¬p are discarded (i.e., are proved to
be not applicable) or
– every applicable rule for ¬p is weaker than an ap-
plicable strict1 or defeasible rule for p.
The formal definitions of derivations and the proof conditions
or inference rules are in Section 5, for the extension of the
logic with the features we are going top describe in the next
section.
3 Modelling temporal rules
In the following, we extend our previous approach in order
to introduce the temporal dimension within the rules. At a
first stage, we provide an informal high-level representation
of the rules. We then refine it in the next section, showing
how high-level rules can be actually modelled within DL. In
the discussion below, we use the causal metaphora to explain
the relationship between the antecedents and the consequent
of the rules. Such a metaphora seems to us quite natural, es-
pecially in case rules are interpreted within a temporal frame-
work. We will further investigate the relationships between
our temporal rules and different definitions of causation in
the literature in Section 4.
We represent rules of the general form:
a1 : d1, . . . ,an : dn ⇒d b : db
Such rules have the following general intuitive interpretation:
• In the rule, all events are represented as a pair e : d,
where e is the identifier of the event and d ∈ N,d ≥ 1
is the duration of the event. As special cases, instan-
taneous event are modelled by d = 1, while persistent
events by d =+∞.
• a1, . . . ,an are the “causes”. They can start at different
points in time.
• b is the “effect”.
• “d” (d ∈Z) is the exact delay between “causes” and “ef-
fect”. “d” cannot be infinite.
The above definition represents a whole general schema of
rules, depending on the choice of the event endpoints which
are related by the delay relation. One may consider the fol-
lowing alternative interpretations :
(1) d is the delay between the start of the last cause and the
beginning of the effect;
1Notice that a strict rule can be defeated only when its antecedent
is defeasibly provable.
(2) d is the delay between the end of the last cause and the
beginning of the effect (of course, in such an interpreta-
tion the duration of the causes cannot be infinite).
Other alternatives are technically possible, but seem to us not
very motivated from the applicative point of view. For in-
stance, considering d the delay between the start (or end) of
the first cause and the start of the effect seems to us quite
counter-intuitive. In fact, if all a1, . . .an are explicitly neces-
sary to trigger the rule, it seems quite unnatural that the rules
is then triggered as soon as the first of them starts (ends) to
hold.
Then to trigger a rule, different conditions have to be sat-
isfied, depending on the chosen interpretation. For instance,
let us consider the intuitive triggering conditions for case (2)
above (and supposing that all durations are finite).
1. we must be able to prove each ai for exactly di consec-
utive time intervals, i.e., ∀i∃t0, t1, . . . tdi , tdi+1 consecutive
time intervals such that we can not prove ai at time t0,
we can prove ai at times t1, . . . tdi , and we cannot prove
ai at time tdi+1
2. Let tmaxa =max{td j}1≤ j ≤ n be the last time when the
latest cause can be proven.
3. b can be proven for db instants starting from time tmaxa +
d, i.e., it can be proven in all the time instants between
tmaxa +d−1 and tmaxa +d+db+1.
4 Causation
Since causation “is common in scientific thinking” and “is
dominant in everyday commonsense thinking” [24], it has
been widely studied by many AI approaches, mainly aiming
to provide computational models of causal reasoning. In par-
ticular, many approaches have focused on the relationships
between time and causation, starting, e.g., from the pioneer-
ing reified logics by McDermott [18] and Allen [1], and by
the approaches by Shoham [24], Konolidge [15] and Sande-
wall [23], that underlined the defeasible character of causal
connection and\or stressed the strict relationship between
causal reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning (e.g., to deal
with change).
Moreover, several approaches focused specifically on the
temporal relationships between causes and effects. The prob-
lem of determining such temporal constraints is still an open
one: for instance, there seems to be no agreement on whether
“backward” causation (i.e., causal relations in which the ef-
fects can precede the causes) is possible or not (for a col-
lection of accounts on causation by many of the outstanding
contemporary philosophers see Sosa [25]).
While domain-dependent approaches in specific applica-
tion areas have devised restrictive “ad-hoc” definitions (see,
e.g., [14] in the medical field), many approaches only identi-
fied very general temporal constraint (namely, the constraint
that the beginning of the effect cannot precede the beginning
of the causes [24; 18; 1]). An interesting proposal has been
devised by Reiger and Grinberg [22], who distinguished be-
tween different types of causation depending on the different
temporal relations they impose between causes and effects.
In particular, in a “One-shot” causal relation the presence of
the cause is required only momentarily in order to allow the
effect to begin (e.g., to kick a ball causes the ball to move),
while in a “Continuous” causal relation the presence of the
cause is required in order to begin and sustain the effect (e.g.,
to run causes the production of lactic acid). Other researchers
have followed such a line of research. For instance, within
the CYC ontology, Guha and Lenat [13] have identified also
“Mutually sustaining” causal relations (e.g., “poverty and il-
literacy were mutually sustaining problems plaguing America
all during the 1970s”), in which each bit of the cause causes
a slightly later bit of the effect, and viceversa (i.e., causes
and effects are co-temporal). Analogously, Terenziani and
Torasso [26] have introduced also “Culminated Event Cau-
sation”, to model causal relationships where the cause is an
accomplishment, whose culmination must be reached in or-
der to enforce the effect to start (e.g., switching the light on is
an activity with a goal, and its effect –having the light on– is
reached with the culmination of such an activity).
The definition of rules we have proposed in Section 3 can
model causation, by interpreting the antecedents of the rules
as causes and the consequents as effects. Of course, the defea-
sible non-monotonic character of causation is naturally coped
with by the underlying defeasible logic. Moreover, the defini-
tion of rules we have provided is very general, so that all the
above different types of temporal constraints between causes
and effects can be captured (as special cases of the general
rule) by suitably restricting the values of delay and durations
in the rule. For the sake of simplicity, we exemplify such
a claim considering simple rules with just one antecedent
(cause), i.e., rules of the form
a : ta ⇒d b : tb
and considering the interpretation (2) for delays (the case of
interpretation (1) is analogous):
• We can model “backward” causation, by considering a
negative delay between causes and effects, so that 0 >
ta+d;
• “one-shot” causation can be modelled with 0 ≤ ta + d
and 0< tb+d;
• “continuous” causation can be modelled with 0≤ ta+d
and 0≥ tb+d;
• “mutually sustaining” causation can be modelled with
0= ta+d, and 0= tb+d;
• “culminated event causation” can be modelled simply by
imposing 0≤ d.
5 Temporalised Defeasible Logic
As usual with non-monotonic reasoning, we have to specify
1) how to represent a knowledge base and 2) the inference
mechanism used to reason with the knowledge base. The lan-
guage of temporal Defeasible Logic consists of a (numerable)
set of atomic propositions Prop = {p,q, . . .}, a discrete to-
tally ordered set of instants of time T = {t1, t2, . . .} and the
negation sign ¬.
We supplement the usual definition of literal (an atomic
proposition in Prop or the negation of it), with two notions
of temporalised literals, one notion to indicate when a literal
holds (i.e., p@t, where t ∈ T ) and the duration of an event
(i.e., p : d, d ∈N). Intuitively p@t means that p holds at time
t, and p : d means that p holds for d time instants. Given
a (temporalised) literal p, ∼ p denotes the complement of p,
that is∼ p=¬q if p= q, q∈ Prop, and∼ p= q if p=¬q for
some q ∈ Prop.
Formally a rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r)
(A(r)may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set
of temporal literals of the form p : d, an arrow (we will use→
for strict rules, ⇒ for defeasible rules, and ; for defeaters,
and ↪→ as a variable ranging over any of three types of rule),
and its consequent (or head) C(r) which is a temporal literal
of the form p : d. The arrow of a rule r is labelled by a natural
number d, the delay of r; we will use δ (r) to denote the delay
of r. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of strict rules in
R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the
set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the set of defeaters in
R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
q : d, for some d.
A temporalised defeasible theory is a structure
(T , t0,F,R,) where: T = {t1, t2, . . .} is a discrete to-
tally ordered set of instants of time; t0 ∈ T is the reference
point (or origin) of T ; F is a finite set of facts, i.e., of
temporalised literals of form p@t; R is a finite set of rules;
, the superiority relation, is a binary relation over R such
that the transitive closure of it is acyclic.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of
the following four forms:
+∆q@t meaning that q is definitely provable, at time t, in D
(i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q@t meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely
provable, at time t, in D.
+∂q@t meaning that q is defeasibly provable, at time t, in
D.
−∂q@t meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly
provable, at time t, in D.
The proof tags tell us whether it is possible to prove a conclu-
sion at a specific time and the strength or confidence of the
conclusion.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or
proof) in D. A derivation is a finite sequence P =
(P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying the proof con-
ditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the
kinds of conclusion). P(1..n) denotes the initial part of the
sequence P of length n.
Before introducing the proof conditions for the proof tags
relevant to this paper we provide some auxiliary notions.
From now on we will use # as a variable ranging over {∆,∂}.
All the remining definition refer to a derivation P.
Definition 1 A temporalised literal p : d is #-active at t iff 1)
−#p@t − 1 ∈ P(1..n), 2) ∀t ′, t − 1 < t ′ ≤ t + d, +#p@t ′ ∈
P(1..n), and 3)−#p@t+d+1 ∈ P(1..n). If d =+∞ then the
last condition does not apply.
Intuitively that a literal a : d is #-active at t means that the
event a started at t and lasted for d instants. Based on the
notion of #-active time we can define the activation time of
a rule. The idea is that at the activation time a rule becomes
active and trigger its own conclusion.
Definition 2 Let r be a rule. A set AT (r) ⊂ T is an #-
activation set of r iff
1. there is a surjective mapping ρ from A(r) to AT (r), and
2. ∀ai : di ∈ A(r), ai : di is #-active at ρ(ai : di).
t is a #-activation time for r iff there is a #-activation set
AT (R) such that t =max(AT (r)).
Since there it is possible that a temporal literal a : d is active
at different times, then there are many activation times for a
rule. The activation time for a rule is used to determine when
the rule fires and when the effect of the rule (its consequent)
will be produced. The formal relationship between the appli-
cation time, the delay and the start of the effect is given in the
following definition.
Definition 3 A rule r is #-applicable at t iff t− δ (r) is a #-
application time for r.
Finally we give a definition about the potential duration of the
effect of a rule.
Definition 4 A rule r ∈ Rsd [p : dr] is (t, t ′)-effective iff r is
∂ -applicable at t and t ′− t < dr.
Let us concentrate on the conditions that prevent a rules to be
triggered. Again we start from temporal literals.
Definition 5 A temporal literal a : d is #-passive at time t iff
∃t ′ ∈ t ≤ t < t+d+1 such that −#a@t.
This means that a temporal literal is passive at time t if there
is an instant in the interval t, t+ d where the literal does not
hold.
Definition 6 A rule r is #-discarded at time t iff ∃ai : di ∈A(r)
such that ∀t ′ < t−δ (r), ai : di is #-passive at t.
We define now a condition to determine whether an applica-
ble rule does not produce its effect since the derivation of the
effect is blocked by a stronger rules preventing the effect.
Definition 7 A rule r ∈ Rsd [p : dr] defeats a rule s ∈ R[∼ p :
ds] at time t iff 1) s is ∂ -applicable at t, and 2) r is (t ′, t)-
effective, and 3) r  s.
The effect of a rule, i.e., its consequent, has a duration, so
the effect can persist. The next definition captures the idea of
persistence in an interval.
Definition 8 A rule r ∈ Rsd [p : dr] persists at time t iff
• r is ∂ -applicable at t ′, t − dr < t ′ < t and +∂ p@t ′ ∈
P(1..n) and
• ∀t ′′, t ′ < t ′′ ≤ t, ∀s ∈ R[∼ p] either
– s is ∂ -discarded at t ′′ or
– if s is (t ′′′, t ′′)-effective, then ∃v ∈ Rsd [p] such that v
defeats s at t ′′′.
We are now ready to give the proof conditions for +∆, −∆,
+∂ and −∂ .
Proof condition for +∆
If +∆p@t = P(n+1) then
(1) p@t ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[p], r is ∆-applicable at t, or
(3) ∃r ∈ Rs[p], r is ∆-applicable at t ′ and t−δ (r)< t ′.
The above condition is the normal condition for definite (pos-
itive) proofs in defeasible logic, that is, monotonic derivations
using forward chaining, or modus ponens. The only things to
notice are that: (1) each literal ai : di in the antecedent must
be definitely proved for exactly di times; (2) clause (3) is a
persistence clause and allows us to derive p at time t if we
have previously proved p at time t ′ and the distance between
t and t ′ is less than the duration of a strict rule for p applicable
at t ′.
Proof condition for −∆
If −∆p@t = P(n+1) then
(1) p@t /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[p], r is ∆-discarded at t and
(3) ∀r ∈ Rs[p], if r is ∆-applicable at t ′, then t ′+δ (r)< t.
To prove that a definite conclusion is not possible we have to
show that all attempts to give a definite proof of the conclu-
sion fail. In particular we have ro check that all strict rules
for ∼ p will not produce an effect at t.
Proof condition for +∂
If +∂ p@t = P(n+1) then
(1) +∆p@t ∈ P(1..n) or
(2)(1) −∆∼ p@t ∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [p] such that r either r persists at t or
r is ∂ -applicable at t, and
(3) ∀s ∈ R[∼ p] either
(1) s is ∂ -discarded at t or
(2) if s is (t ′, t)-effective,
then ∃v ∈ Rsd [p], such that v defeats s at t ′.
Clauses (1) and (2.1) are the usual clauses of standard de-
feasible logic only relativised to a time instant. In particular
clause (1) allows us to weaken a definite conclusion to a de-
feasible conclusions. Clause (2.1) ensures consistency of the
logic, i.e., a stronger proof for the opposite of what we want
to prove is not possible. Clause (2.2) requires that at least one
rule for p can indeed produce p at time t. Thus we have to
subtract the delay from t to see whether the last cause of the
rule started at t − d. Clause (3.1) is intended to check that
each rule for the negation of the conclusion we want to prove
is either discarded at t. i.e., one of the causes of this rule has
been proved not to hold for the right duration. Otherwise,
an applicable rule for ∼ p producing the effect at t must be
blocked by a stronger rule for p. The stronger rule should
block the beginning of the effect ∼ p.
Let us consider a theory where F = {a@0,b@5,c@5} and
with the rules
r1 : a : 1⇒10 d : 10, r2 : b : 1⇒7 ¬d : 5, r3 : c : 1⇒8 d : 5
where r3  r2. Based on this theory we can derive +∂d@10.
r1 is ∂ -applicable and r2 is ∂ -discarded. At time 11 we can
derive d since r1 persists here. At time 12 r2 is no longer
discarded, so r2 interrupts the effect of r1. Since we have
no means to determine which reason prevails we derive both
−∂d@12 and −∂¬d@12. At 13 rule r3 becomes active and
defeats r2, thus from 13 to 18 we can derive d. However,
r3 terminates its effect at 18, and r1, whose duration would
ensure that d persists till 20, cannot be used to derive d since
the effect of r1 was terminated by r2 at time 12.
Proof condition for −∂
If −∂ p@t = P(n+1) then
(1) −∆p@t ∈ P(1..n) and
(2)(1) +∆∼ p@t /∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [p] r does not persist at t and
is ∂ -discarded at t, or
(3) ∃s ∈ R[∼ p] such that
(1) s is (t ′, t)-effective, and
(2) ∀v ∈ Rsd [p], v does not defeat s at t ′.
To prove that a defeasible conclusion is not possible we have
to show that all attempts to give a defeasible proof of the con-
clusion fail. In particular we have ro check that all rules for
∼ p will not produce an effect at t, and if they were to pro-
duce it there are some active rules for the negation not weaker
than rules for the conclusion and the rules are effective at the
appropriate instants.
Maher [16] proved that for standard defeasible logic the
extension of a defeasible theory can be computed in time lin-
ear to the size of the theory (where the size of the theory is
in function of the number of symbols and rules in it). [10]
extended the result to more expressive defeasible logic. For
the temporal extension presented here we can preserve the
complexity results for theories without backward causation.
Theorem 1 Let D be a temporalised defeasible theory with-
out backward causation. Then the extension of D from t0 and
t ∈T (i.e., the set of all consequences based on the signature
of D derivable from t0 and t) can be computed in time linear
to the size or theory. i.e.. O(|Prop|× |R|× t).
Proof (sketch). The idea is to consider snapshots of the the-
ory at every single instant from t0 and t. The rules are lin-
early reduced to the language of [11]. In particular temporal
literals in the antecedent are understood as a set of temporal
literals with timestamps and literal with infinite duration are
dealt with persistent rules. After these steps we can apply the
technique of [10] to compute in linear time the extension of
the resulting equivalent theory.
It is important to notice that, although the rules contain
temporal constraints that are related to STP (Simple Temporal
Problem [5]), in the environment we consider in this paper, no
“classical” form of temporal reasoning (in the sense of tem-
poral constraint propagation [5]) is required. For example, let
us consider the following simple set of rules, involving delays
between instantaneous events:
{a : 1⇒10 b : 1, b : 1⇒10 c : 1, a : 1⇒10 c : 1}
In a “classical” temporal constraint environment, such as in
the STP framework, the rules in the set would be interpreted
as a conjunction, so that constraint propagation could be used
in order to infer from the first two dependencies that (in case
the interpretation (2) is chosen for the delay) the delay be-
tween a and c is 21, so that the whole set of constraints is not
consistent.
On the other hand, within the DL environment we are
working in this paper, the above set is simply interpreted as
a set of alternative rules. In such a context, one can consis-
tently say that c can be caused by a through the first two rules
(where the delay between a and c is 21), or directly through
the third rule (and, in such a case, the delay is 10).
6 Conclusion and Future Extensions
In this paper, we have proposed a temporal extension of de-
feasible logic in order to deal with temporalised durative
facts, and with (possible) delays between antecedents and
consequences of the rules. The extension we propose
• increases the expressiveness of the logic, as needed to
deal with temporal phenomena in several application do-
mains, and, in particular, with different types of causal
relationships;
• maintains the computational properties of the original
logic. Indeed, the temporal extension has been carefully
shaped in order to maintain (in case backward causation
rules are not used) the linear complexity of the original
logic.
As future work, we aim at analysing the complexity of the
extended logic, in case also backward causation rules (i.e.,
rules in which the consequent can start before the antecedent)
are taken into account. The addition of backward rules makes
complexity significantly harder, since it requires to navigate
the timeline also backward. Our conjecture is that, in such a
case, the complexity becomes quadratic on the overall span
of time determined by the period of repetition of all the cy-
cles of the rules in the theory. Moreover, we would like to
investigate the possibility of further extending the expressive-
ness of the temporal part of the rules with the introduction of
STP-like ([5]) temporal constraints between the propositions
in the rules. The core of this extension will be an accurate
analysis of the trade-off between expressiveness and com-
putational complexity, since we aim at retaining as much as
possible the linear complexity property of the original logic.
Finally, we also would like to analyse the possibility of distin-
guishing in the logic among different classes of propositions
(e.g., stative propositions such as being asleep vs proposi-
tions denoting events with a culmination, such as building a
house) on the basis of their temporal properties, as suggested
by many approaches in the linguistic literature (see, e.g., [19;
27] and also, e.g., in [26].
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